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Prosecution Benefits: A New HOPE for Bridging
the Patent Law Access Gap
Eben Allen
I. INTRODUCTION
In January 2010, a massive earthquake struck Haiti.1 Months after the
quake, although relief efforts continued in the impoverished nation, an
epidemic of cholera suddenly broke out.2 Thousands of people contracted
the disease, and hospitals struggled to keep up with treatments as the death
toll mounted.3 Humanitarian organizations worked with the government to
rush massive quantities of aid supplies, including 10,000 boxes of water
purification tablets and 2,500 jerricans, yet the disease continued to spread
such that nearly a month later, one United Nations plan was still calling for
$89 million for clean water and sanitation and hygiene supplies.4
Cholera’s spread in the aftermath of the quake is significant because
cholera is not easily communicable between people and is almost entirely
transmitted by contaminated water and food.5 Yet, due to the extreme
poverty and natural disaster fallout in Haiti, the disease continued to spread


JD Seattle University School of Law, expected 2012. BS Mechanical Engineering, cum
laude, University of Portland 2007. Eben would like to thank his parents (Bruce and Jan
Allen) and his wife (Roxanne Allen) for all of their encouragement and patience during
the writing process. Additionally, he extends a special thanks to the SJSJ Editorial Staff
and Professor Heidi Bond for their valuable insight in improving his article.
1
Press Conference, Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator on Humanitarian Efforts in
(Oct.
22,
2010),
Haiti,
United
Nations
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2010/101022_Bragg.doc.htm
[hereinafter
Bragg].
2
Id.
3
Randal C. Archibold, Cholera Deaths Up in Haiti, With Worst to Come, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 2010, at A4.
4
Id.; Bragg, supra note 1.
5
2010
Haiti
Cholera
Outbreak,
CENTER
FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL,
http://www.cdc.gov/haiticholera/preventionandcontrol.htm (last updated Nov. 4, 2010).
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as Haitians were unable to access clean water.6 The aid provided was still
insufficient to meet the needs of the Haitian people—insufficient to fully
and quickly quell the plague.7 But what if the resources available had more
purchasing power: what if the dollars channeled through humanitarian
organizations were able to purchase more aid supplies for the same price?
What if the cost of water purification technology was cheaper and more
readily available to this stricken nation?
Intellectual property regimes foster the innovation of new technologies,
including water purification. However, these regimes also often raise the
price of that technology. This hinders people’s ability to access the
technology due to the increased expenditure required to acquire the
technology. Scholars have suggested various approaches for leveraging
exclusive intellectual property rights (such as patents) to alleviate this
access problem.8 However, very few consider utilizing the process known
as patent prosecution, which is the application process used to acquire these
patents in the first place. Nevertheless, simple adjustments in the patent
prosecution process could be implemented to both alleviate the access
problem and resolve issues inherent in patent prosecution.9

6

Archibold, supra note 3.
Compare Bragg, supra note 1 (138 deaths as of October 22, 2010), with Archibold,
supra note 3 (917 deaths as of November 14, 2010).
8
Several such proposals are discussed infra Part II, Section B.
9
The primary concerns with the current patent prosecution process are its speed, cost,
and high degree of complexity, as discussed infra Part II, Section C.
7
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While many of the proposed solutions to the access problem are not
based on prosecution, these approaches still provide valuable lessons about
the components necessary for an effective access solution. This article
explores those lessons and forms them into a prosecution-based approach to
the access problem. This approach is to implement a new patent
classification—a specialized set of rules for lifesaving technology—that
offers prosecution benefits in exchange for minimal restrictions that both
improve access and protect an innovator’s ability to charge a premium in
the primary market. Such a classification provides a compromise between
the socially just desire to make new technology affordable for humanitarian
purposes and the economic need to make innovation profitable.
In Part II, this article explores the background of the access problem
inherent in intellectual property law. Section A explores the competing aims
that give rise to the access problem. Section B reviews some accessimproving approaches suggested by scholarship and implemented via
legislation. Finally, Section C outlines a new approach that focuses on
prosecution benefits. This approach is to establish a new patent
classification that will simultaneously benefit both society (by improving
access) and businesses (by alleviating onerous aspects of the patent
prosecution process). Because the new classification would have a strong
humanitarian dimension and would address the most drastic instances of the
access problem, the new classification proposed by this article is called the
Humanitarian-Objective Patent Endorsement, or “HOPE” Certification.
Such an approach engages the access issue in a preemptive instead of a
reactionary manner, and the HOPE Certification can be modeled after the
special classifications for plant and design patents. Since both plant and
design classifications define (1) the particular subject matter covered by the
classifications and (2) the rules that apply specifically to the classifications,
Part III discusses the subject matter definition necessary for the HOPE
classification. Part IV covers the rationale and mechanics behind the
suggested rules for the implementation of the HOPE Certification.
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II. UNDERSTANDING THE ACCESS PROBLEM
A. Defining the Access Problem
The purpose of patent law is to “advance the public welfare through the
talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”10 Patent law
accomplishes this through a simple exchange: full disclosure of how to
make and utilize an invention11 in exchange for a limited monopoly on the
invention’s implementation in any form.12 Reflected in this exchange are
the two principal values of patent law: providing incentives for invention
and providing access to technology.13 This “need for access/need for
incentive dichotomy”14 is at the heart of patent law, and this article will
refer to it as the “innovation dichotomy.”
1. Providing Incentives for Invention
The “economic philosophy behind the clause [in the US Constitution]
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to
advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in

10

Charles Allen Black, The Cure for Deadly Patent Practices: Preventing Technology
Suppression and Patent Shelving in the Life Sciences, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 397,
401–02 (2004) (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)).
11
The standard of disclosure mandated by US patent statutes is a written description that
sets forth “the manner and process of making and using [the invention] in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . .
to make and use the same.” 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-129, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
12
Patent statutes give a patent holder the right to exclude others from making, using,
selling, offering to sell, or importing the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). In the
United States, the duration of this exclusionary right lasts twenty years from the
application date of the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
13
Wesley A. Cann, Jr., On the Relationship Between Intellectual Property Rights and
the Need of Less-Developed Countries for Access to Pharmaceuticals: Creating a Legal
Duty to Supply Under a Theory of Progressive Global Constitutionalism, 25 U. PA. J.
INT’L ECON. L. 755, 757 (2004).
14
Id.
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‘Science and useful Arts.’”15 “In a world of limited resources and easily
shared knowledge, there is little incentive for anyone to undertake the
substantial costs and risks of research when the reward is shared by any
who wish to mimic the advance.”16 For this reason, in US patent law, the
inventor of a new technology is guaranteed a monopoly on the new
technology for a limited time, specifically the “power to prevent [others]
from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the patented
invention.”17 This right to exclude all other competitors from independently
utilizing the invention has two benefits. First, it provides the inventor with
sufficient time to recover the expenditures made in developing the
invention. Second, it serves as an opportunity to make a profit, providing
the personal gain that the Founding Fathers deemed may serve as the best
way to motivate and foster technological advances.
2. Providing Access to Technology
The disclosure part of the exchange is intended to ensure that the
invention will be available to the public at large once the patent has run its
course—that people beyond the initial inventor will understand how the
invention works. Such understanding ensures that the public can maximize
the use of the invention in three ways. First, disclosure ensures that the
technology will not be lost should the initial producer be unable to continue
supplying the market with the product of his or her invention (e.g., in the
case of an inventor dying without explaining his invention or a company
going out of business without ever revealing its processes). Second, the
public is better able to implement technology that is already well-explained
in publicly available patent paperwork. Third, subsequent individuals will
be better able to improve upon the design if they understand the

15

Black, supra note 10, at 402 (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)).
Michael Ilg, Market Competition in Aid of Humanitarian Concern: Reconsidering
Pharmaceutical Drug Patents, 9 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 149–50 (2010).
17
Black, supra note 10, at 401–02.
16
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fundamentals of how it works in the first place. The public thus avoids the
risk of losing inventions, expands the value of the immediate
implementation, and gains the value of subsequent improvements.18
3. The Difficult Balance Between Access and Incentive
Patent laws accordingly attempt to balance “two competing goals: giving
adequate economic incentives to pioneering inventors while ensuring that
the improvers who follow—and the public as a whole—[can] make
effective use of inventions.”19 While the goal is to organize patent law in
such a manner as to maximize gain in both categories (incentives and
access), sometimes the values are mutually exclusive instead of mutually
beneficial.
The tension between the two interests is often most easily visible in the
context of lifesaving technology when access would seem to deserve more
weight in the balancing test than incentive. A greater emphasis on the
incentive of personal gain can result in a substantial portion of the public
never receiving the benefit of the innovation; the people that most
desperately need the innovation die before the innovation becomes
accessible to them. This can happen either by the nefarious refusal to use
patented technology or by the less suspect—but also problematic—pricing
considerations in implementing patented technology.
a) Nefarious Refusal to Use Patented Technology
A troubling side effect of a patent holder’s right to exclude others from
utilizing an invention is that the right to exclude applies equally to
lifesaving technology.20 Should a patent holder so choose, he or she may
18

A goal of patent law is “ensuring that the improvers who followed [the pioneering
inventors]—and the public as a whole—could make effective use of inventions.” Id. at
401 (quoting Matthew J. Conigliaro et al., Foreseeability in Patent Law, 16 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1045–1046 (2001)) (emphasis added). The focus on these three distinct classes
suggests three ways that disclosure maximizes use of innovation.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 408.
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“legitimately” exert the exclusionary right to outright block consumer
access to lifesaving technology.21 The two most common approaches are:
“inventing and patenting new technology with the intent that it never be
used” (‘sleeping patents’), and “acquiring patents from others with the
intent not to develop the technology” (‘patent shelving’).”22 While the
solution suggested in this article could apply to the sleeping patents issue,
this article focuses instead on the non-malicious price considerations that
follow. As such, the very real and disturbing problem of nefarious refusal to
use patented technology is beyond the scope of this article.23
b) Problematic Pricing Considerations
A slightly different result of these competing goals of incentive and
access is that some individuals may become unable to afford lifesaving
technology because the premium put in place by intellectual property
protections raises the price of the technology beyond the individual’s
means.24 This problem is commonly referred to as “deadweight loss.”25
In his article regarding pharmaceutical drug patents, Michael Ilg explains
deadweight loss and the amplification of its significance in the context of
lifesaving technology:
A core difficulty of the patent approach, inherent since its
inception, has been the loss of willing consumers due to monopoly
pricing, identified as deadweight loss in economic terms. So as
monopoly pricing extracts a lucrative price premium, it is
inefficient, in that many willing consumers who would be able to
purchase at a price lower than the monopoly price are excluded,
and there is a block of lost purchasers due to the artificially-high
price floor of the monopoly patent protection. While the loss of
efficient pricing because of monopoly protection is an abstract
21
22
23
24
25

Id.
Id.
However, for a fascinating look at this issue, see id.
Ilg, supra note 16, at 156–57.
Id.
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issue of access which concentrates upon lost potential consumers,
the question of access has gone far beyond deadweight loss and
optimal purchase price. The issue of access has shifted perceptibly
from abstract shades of grey into stark relief; from concerns over
lost consumer purchasers at a monopoly price point to pointed
humanitarian concerns over receipt of needed relief.26
As Ilg points out, deadweight loss is often simply an economic
consideration: a way of calculating the number of customers excluded by
the high monopoly price. However, his comment prompts an important
question: if society decides that deadweight loss is an acceptable price to
pay for innovation when it simply excludes some customers from a
convenient technology, then is society still willing to accept the price when
technology is potentially lifesaving, and deadweight loss begins to literally
refer to the dead?
The two cogent examples that follow, both of which have been
extensively documented in scholarship, show that this is not simply a
philosophical rumination, but a weighty social concern.
(1) AIDS Medication
“According to the World Health Organization, 95 percent of those
infected with HIV live in developing countries.”27 “Despite the existence of
treatments, the vast majority of those infected with HIV do not have access
to the pharmaceutical products that are available in many developed
countries (e.g., Canada and the United States).”28 “The result is an access
gap, whereby patients in low- and middle-income countries cannot afford

26

Id.
Mark D. Penner & Prakash Narayanan, Amendments to the Canadian Patent Act to
Address Drug Access: Is Help on the Way?, 60 FOOD DRUG L.J. 459, 460 (2005).
28
Id.
27
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expensive patented drugs, while patients in wealthy countries can afford and
do have access to such treatments.”29
In certain instances, the gap does narrow when patents finally expire. For
example, “the average worldwide price for antiretroviral combination
therapies (ARVs) that treat HIV/AIDS decreased from $10,000 to as little
as $168 per patient upon expiration of key patents. This price reduction
significantly enhanced access to critical treatments for millions who
desperately need them.”30 However, two questions still remain. How many
lives were priced out of the market while waiting for the cost of this
particular treatment to drop to an affordable level? How many more people
will die before the currently available medications eventually become
economically feasible for those most in need of them?
(2) Agricultural Advances
Agriculture is arguably “the key to global food security and economic
development in the world’s poorest countries.”31 With the advent of
genetically modified crops that can produce higher yields or greater
resistance to pests, one might expect that starvation should no longer be an
issue in poor areas of the world.32 However, major corporations such as
Monsanto hold many of the patents on these technologies and vigorously
deny general access to them.33 In poverty-stricken locations, the premiums
charged for the seeds are often so high that poor, rural farmers find
themselves with no choice but to incur massive debts just to purchase the
29

Beirne Roose-Snyder & Megan K. Doyle, The Global Health Licensing Program: A
New Model for Humanitarian Licensing at the University Level, 35 AM. J. L. & MED.
281, 281–82 (2009).
30
Peter Lee, Toward a Distributive Commons in Patent Law, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 917,
919 (2009).
31
See Ronald L. Phillips, Introduction: Intellectual Property Rights for the Public Good:
Obligations of U.S. Universities to Developing Countries, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 177,
180 (2004).
32
Jeffrey J. Mindrup, Transgenic Crops in the Age of Human Rights: Moral Uncertainty
and Rational Risk Policy, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 213, 226 (2007).
33
Id. at 227.
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only seed with sufficient yield to sustain and feed their families.34 The
resulting question is similar to that of medications: how many lives were
priced out of the market simply because the newest and most promising
agricultural technology was unavailable to those most in need of it, and the
unavailability was not due to the expense of production, but rather to the
expense of intellectual property markups?
c) Addressing the Innovation Dichotomy Balance
Even advocating for placing the highest priority on the preservation of
human life, always choosing access in favor of incentive would be selfdefeating. On the one hand, without incentives many lifesaving
technologies would not exist, and many people would die who could
otherwise have been saved by new technologies. On the other hand, if
technology pricing is so inflated by the monopoly incentive that the
technologies are inaccessible to all but the inventors and those able to pay
absolute top dollar, then those same people will still die. Thus, the
incentive’s utility is negated or diminished. While in an ideal world, any
incentive for innovation would provide a reciprocal gain to access,
achieving a perfect balance that will work for every given situation in
reality is likely impossible. Yet, when people with the greatest need have
the least access to the solutions, the system requires revision.
However, patents clearly do not cause this disparity between need and
access in every situation. Thus, a comprehensive overhaul of the system is
not necessary; instead, creative solutions are needed to specifically target
the greatest disparities and add incentives to provide access where it is most
crucial. The section that follows surveys various approaches suggested in
scholarship to address the innovation dichotomy, after which this article

34
See, e.g., Somini Sengupta, On India’s Despairing Farms, a Plague of Suicide, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006, at A1 (“The modified seeds can cost nearly twice as much as
ordinary ones, and they have nudged many farmers toward taking on ever larger loans,
often from moneylenders charging exorbitant interest rates.”).
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will discuss a new potential tool in alleviating the access gap and balancing
the innovation dichotomy: a new classification within patent prosecution.
B. Approaches to Address the Access Problem
Action taken to address the access problem falls into two main camps:
scholarship and legislation. Many authors contribute to the scholarship by
proposing theories in journals and other publications in an effort to improve
understanding of the issue. At the same time, a few of the proposals have
been the subject of government response, and government bodies around
the world have introduced legislation to address the access problem.35
1. Scholarship
Much ink has been spilled regarding this innovation dichotomy, and
scholars have sought and suggested solutions, particularly in the access to
medication discussion.36 At some level, any proposed solution affects the
basic exchange of patent law, either by adjusting the rights conferred by a
patent or by modifying the conditions imposed to receive the patent rights.
Changing the rights or the conditions in turn affects access to lifesaving
technology as well as incentives to invent. The challenge is to find a set of
adjustments to both patent conditions and patent rights such that an increase
is realized not only in access to lifesaving technology, but also in incentives
to invent. The varied scholarly solutions provide useful insight into what
modifications to rights and conditions are available, and the
recommendations suggest components that can be incorporated in future
approaches to ensure that newly proposed solutions are effective.
a) Adjustments to Term Length
Currently, the basic exchange of conditions for rights in patent law is
relatively straightforward. The condition is that an inventor must fully
35
36

E.g., TRIPS and the Bayh-Dole Act, discussed infra Part II, Section B(3)(a).
Cann, supra note 13, at 757.
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disclose an invention by sufficiently explaining in a patent application how
the invention works and how to make it.37 In return, the inventor receives
the right to exclude any other person from utilizing38 the invention for
twenty years.39
The exact proportions of this exchange have been modified over the
years, most notably with the length of the term of the patent’s validity.40
Accordingly, one solution that scholars have proposed is to shorten the term
of patents for humanitarian contexts so that humanitarian technology
escapes exclusionary control sooner.41 However, simply shortening the term
is likely to be an ineffective long-term solution that simply falls prey to the
perpetual debate about what precisely is the optimum term length to balance
public access against inventive incentive. However, this option is helpful in
that it suggests creating a solution that is narrowly tailored to a specific
subject matter to achieve a more specialized and nuanced approach instead
of attempting to use a one-size-fits-all approach.42
37
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (“The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the
best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.”).
38
“Utilizing” includes making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the invention.
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
39
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
40
For a discussion of the historical progression of term length from fourteen to
seventeen to twenty years, see ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A.
LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 132 (5th ed.
2010).
41
See Roose-Snyder & Doyle, supra note 29, at 301 (noting that some humanitarian
licensing schemes “propose shortening the life of an exclusive license to less than the life
of a patent” to protect against underperforming developers through the option to find
another). While the article suggests making a context-specific limitation (in this case a
humanitarian context) on the duration of the term of a license, the concept applies equally
well to suggest a context-specific limitation on the duration of the term of a patent.
42
In fact, patent law already implements subject-matter-specific solutions: the USPTO
has developed special procedural rules for distinct subject matter such as plant patents
and design patents. Manual of Patent Examination and Procedure, §§ 1500, 1600 (8th ed.,
Rev. 4, Oct. 2005) [hereinafter MPEP].
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Another term-adjusting solution proposed by scholars is the
implementation of severable or transferrable patent terms.43 Also called
“wild card patent extensions” in other scholarship,44 this suggested
mechanism addresses the access disparity by rewarding an inventor and
developer of humanitarian technology with an award of additional
monopoly time on other patented and profitable technology.45 An example
of the implementation of this system could be “allowing a company
developing a new agent targeting a disease or drug-resistant pathogen that
would otherwise not have a high-profit margin to extend the patent term on
a high-profit-making drug already within their active portfolio.”46 This
would motivate development of—and access to—lifesaving technology, not
by focusing on the profitability of that technology, but instead by focusing
on the gain from a greater exploitation of an unrelated profitable
technology.47
In the United States, the scholarly concept of wildcard patent extensions
has reached proposed federal legislation, but no such legislation has ever
passed Congress and been enacted into law.48 In 2005, Congress proposed
the “Project Bioshield II Act of 2005,” which included provisions to allow
companies receiving Food and Drug Administration approval for certain
new high priority drugs to extend the patent on company-selected profitable
drugs already within their active portfolio.49 Congress ultimately rejected
43

See, e.g., Ilg, supra note 16, at 152–53 (proposing a system that grants transferrable
patent terms for significant humanitarian drug developments and their donation).
44
Ann Weilbaecher, Diseases Endemic in Developing Countries: How to Incentivize
Innovation, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 281, 304 (2009) (“The term ‘wild card’ is used
because the drug company can choose the particular drug to which the patent extension is
applied.”).
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Ilg, supra note 16, at 153 (suggesting that this strategy could accordingly equate “the
humanitarian advance at an economic reward level very near to that of the current and
most lucrative blockbuster drug in the marketable segment of patent reward.”).
48
Weilbaecher, supra note 44, at 306.
49
Id.
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the controversial bill in the face of the uncertainty that it could inject into
the patent system.50 While shifting extra patent term length to other
products would cause problems with certainty, the notion of granting a
patent term extension for a qualifying type of patent could be a useful patent
right or an inventive incentive to offer in return for a potentially more
burdensome, yet access-improving condition.
b) Licensing Approaches
Several of the access-improving methods suggested by scholars in the
context of licensing provisions could also be implemented into a statutory
scheme to modify rights and conditions in patent law. Patent holders often
make trades of rights for alternate incentives in the context of transferring
partial rights through licensing agreements. When granting a license, a
patent holder gives up some of his right to exclude by effectively promising
not to exercise the exclusionary right against another entity when that entity
utilizes the patented invention in some specific and agreed upon way.51 Two
considerations affect the impact of licensing: voluntariness and exclusivity.
Usually, a patent holder provides a voluntary license: he or she voluntarily
gives up exclusionary rights, often in exchange for a negotiated payment by
the entity seeking the license.52 However, on occasion, patent holders are
subject to compulsory licenses: they are forced to give up exclusionary
rights, either in exchange for a government-determined payment or without
50

Id. at 306–07 (quoting Kathleen Jaeger, president of the Generic Pharmaceutical
Association) (“The wildcard would destroy the generic industry. We would never know
which products might be protected by the branded maker, and so we would lose the
predictability we need to do our own research and development into drugs coming off
patent.”) (citing Marc Kaufman, Bioterrorism Response Hampered by Problem of Profit,
POST.,
Aug.
7,
2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpWASH.
dyn/content/article/2005/08/06/AR2005080601164.html).
51
RAYMOND T. NIMMER, LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND OTHER
INFORMATION ASSETS 3 (2d ed. 2007).
52
Id. (“Most licenses are part of a commercial transaction where the person transferring
the . . . rights places limitations . . . and retains rights”.). Nimmer’s use of the word
“transaction” signals the voluntary nature of most licenses.
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compensation because the government mandates that the entity be allowed
to use the invention, effectively eliminating the patent holder’s exclusionary
right against that entity.53 A patent holder can also grant exclusive
licenses—granting one particular licensee immunity from the exclusionary
rights and promising not to grant any other entity such immunity (or
nonexclusive licenses granting a licensee immunity) without promising that
another licensee might receive a similar immunity.54
Just as modifying the exclusivity of a license changes its impact,
changing the degree of exclusivity in the patent system could also have
beneficial effects. For example, “some humanitarian licensing proposals
have called for a movement toward utilizing non-exclusive licenses as the
norm” in licensing technology to profit-driven production companies.55 This
same logic could be applied to statutory patent schemes; instead of having a
uniform set of rights across all markets, patent laws could be modified so
that they motivate disclosure in lifesaving technologies (by offering a
monopoly in settings where consumers can likely afford it) while
maintaining a humanitarian exception to the monopoly (for humanitarian
contexts where the consumer is not likely to be able to afford it). Creating a
distinction between the profit and humanitarian markets is a potentially
useful alternative to making all humanitarian technology unprofitable by
eliminating any profit-driven market for it.
Many nations utilize compulsory license provisions domestically to avoid
nonuse of domestically patented inventions; after a reasonable time of
nonuse has passed, a competitor may ask the government for permission to

53

George Tsai, Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime: Lessons for Compulsory
Licensing Schemes Under the WTO Doha Declaration, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 1063, 1064
(2009) (defining compulsory licensing) (“[A]uthorization granted by a government to a
party other than the holder of a patent on an invention to use that invention without the
consent of the patent holder.”).
54
NIMMER, supra note 51, at 4.
55
Roose-Snyder & Doyle, supra note 29, at 301.
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use the invention.56 Internationally, compulsory licensing has only been
used to date “in emergency situations where patent-protected
pharmaceuticals were seen as prohibitively expensive.”57 In the United
States, Congress has introduced bills that would adopt a compulsory
licensing exception to current patent laws, but none have passed.58 Given
the setup of the US patent regime, were such a bill to pass, it would not give
an access-deprived individual a private right of action59 against the patent
holder for either shelving the patent or setting the price beyond a given
threshold of access—it would only give the right to another to use the
technology.60
Such immunity from infringement claims would provide a greater boost
to access than what is currently imposed by international treaty obligations.
The United States is subject to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), an international patent treaty.61 As the
TRIPS regime currently stands, a manufacturer could produce medication
for use in another country that meets certain specifications, even though a

56

Black, supra note 10, at 433.
China, India Push for ‘Patent Free’ Green Tech, EURACTIV, (Nov. 23, 2009),
http://www.euractiv.com/en/innovation/china-india-push-patent-free-green-tech/article187567 (“The Thai government used the mechanism to allow local medicines factories
[to] produce HIV drugs at a fraction of the cost.”).
58
Black, supra note 10, at 433–34.
59
For a viewpoint suggesting that such suits might already be an option due to
international treaty obligations, see Cann, supra note 13, at 877 (“This Article takes the
position that treaty duties—including the duty to provide the highest attainable standard
of health—are enforceable by means of a number of individual and interstate complaint
systems at the domestic, regional, and international levels.”). See also Peter Straub,
Farmers in the IP Wrench—How Patents on Gene-Modified Crops Violate the Right to
Food in Developing Countries, 29 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 187, 189 n.6, 195,
205, 211 (2006) (asserting that various treaties place an obligation on member States to
realize socioeconomic rights “including the right to food”and proposing the utilization of
treaty interpretation canons to resolve the “conflicting obligations” in favor of bypassing
intellectual property regimes on humanitarian grounds).
60
Black, supra note 10, at 433–34.
61
See discussion infra Part II, section B(2)(b).
57
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different entity holds the patent in the United States.62 However, while
compulsory licenses may improve access, they may also generate a problem
with predictability; in doing a cost-benefit analysis of developing a specific
technology, the losses imposed by a compulsory license added after the
patent is issued will not be known and thus cannot be factored into the
initial profitability evaluation that will drive most innovation.
On the opposite end of the spectrum from licensing solutions is the use of
patent pools, which rely on voluntary instead of compulsory licensing. A
patent pool is “an agreement between two or more patent owners to
aggregate (pool) their patents and to license them to one another or to third
parties.”63 This entails a partial giving up of exclusionary rights using an
incentive of receiving reciprocal immunity from the exclusionary rights of
others. Through the collaborative effort between various patent holders,
each individual patent holder or third party is better able to produce and
improve access to lifesaving technology because the net result is that each
party participating in the pool is less restricted in what it is allowed to do.64
An interesting subset of the successful use of patent pools to improve
access to lifesaving technology is the use of one agency as a broker between
profit-motivated private companies and access-motivated humanitarian
organizations. The International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) is a
particularly inspiring example of this approach.65 IRRI is an institute with
the goal of providing access to agricultural advances and has been
substantially involved with genetically engineered rice and the germplasms

62

See discussion infra Part II, section B(2)(b).
Weilbaecher, supra note 44, at 292 (quoting IGWG Briefing Paper on Patent Pools:
Collective Management of Intellectual Property—The Use of Patent Pools to Expand
Access Essential Medical Technologies, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Jan. 23, 2007),
http://keionline.org/content/view/65/1.
64
Id. at 293 (“Patent pools can accelerate innovation by removing problems associated
with ‘blocking’ patents, reducing transaction costs, and streamlining and centralizing
licensing procedures, thereby making it quicker and simpler to obtain licenses.”).
65
Id. at 295.
63
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that contain the genetic information on these advances.66 IRRI works by
acquiring licenses in conjunction with private companies, essentially
compiling a collection of the permissions necessary to implement
agricultural advances in humanitarian contexts without infringing patents.67
As part of the licensing agreements, IRRI implements material transfer
agreements (MTAs) as a compliance or record-keeping measure, ensuring
that the intellectual property utilized in the humanitarian context does not
begin to compete or impinge upon other markets.68 This allows IRRI to
continue to provide these sorts of technologies to their clients, which are
primarily national agricultural research and extension systems (NARES),
national organizations that distribute the crop technology to the individuals
most in need of it in their countries.69
Such a brokering arrangement is valuable in that it brings together many
entities that might otherwise be at odds or unwilling to negotiate on an
individual basis. By representing a large group of humanitarian end-users,
such arrangements can provide organizations with more bargaining power
and better, more uniform, and more reliable intellectual property protection
protocols. Through a brokering agency’s efforts in seeking permission to
use the technology in humanitarian contexts, profit-driven companies
granting the license may stand to gain the ability to reach markets. This is
due to the fact that brokered agreements may also include a simultaneous
compact resolving licensing conflicts with other companies that would
66

Ronald P. Cantrell et al., The Impact of Intellectual Property on Nonprofit Research
Institutions and the Developing Countries They Serve, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 253,
257 (“Historically, IRRI’s intellectual property policy for germplasm was simple, driven
by its mission to ‘improve the well-being of present and future generations of rice
farmers and consumers, particularly those with low incomes.’ As part of this mission,
IRRI produced and disseminated rice germplasm and knowledge without restraint as
global public goods, in a manner readily accessible to the poor.”).
67
Id. at 258, 260 (“The Institute does not own this germplasm, but rather holds it in trust
with the responsibility to conserve, maintain, improve, and distribute it for the benefit of
global agricultural research.”).
68
Id. at 258.
69
Id. at 257.
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otherwise block exploitation in profitable markets.70 IRRI’s use of existing
distribution organizations that function in the context of their specific
circumstances is also a savvy way to achieve a more specialized and
nuanced solution to the context-specific access disparity problem.
Another solution arising partially out of licensing considerations is the
approach of “leveraging public scientific capital.”71 This approach focuses
on the fact that many patented health technologies depend extensively on
“public scientific capital,” that is, contributions of money, research labor,
and bodily materials from public institutions such as federal and state
scientific funding agencies, nonprofit foundations, universities, disease
advocacy groups, and population-based biobanks.72 Essentially, the
“leveraging” consists of withholding health technologies from those that
would only consider the possible profits to be derived from it, effectively
adding a new condition to the basic patent exchange and adding more
weight to the access side of the innovation dichotomy balance. The accessmotivated public entity would disclose and grant a monopoly in a profitable
lifesaving technology in exchange for production of the technology on the
condition that the licensee or monopolist provides access to those that need
it most.73 This notion of encouraging actors toward front-end commitments
is a useful construct for access-improving methods, and it potentially
addresses the predictability problem raised by the after-the-fact nature of
compulsory licenses. While leveraging public scientific capital may in this
way viably assure that access problems do not arise in the context of
technologies that originate in public science, it offers no solution for those
cases where private, profit-driven entities have developed lifesaving
technologies independent of public science sources and thus independent of
70

Id. at 270 (“In exchange for facilitating the availability of GoldenRice(R) for small
farmers in developing countries, Syngenta secured rights to the rice for exploitation in
developed countries.”).
71
Lee, supra note 30, at 944.
72
Id. at 921–22.
73
Id.
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any ties or obligations that may accompany that origin or be imposed upon
it. However, it is a partial solution, and it has gained recognition in
legislation such as the Bayh-Dole Act.74
A similar—but potentially broader—way of imposing additional
conditions that ensure improved access to lifesaving technology is through
working requirements. Working requirements oblige a patent holder to meet
certain requirements or milestones after the patent is issued, or risk some
sort of forfeiture such as compulsory licensing or statutory invalidity.75
For example, the patent statutes could be modified to impose a working
requirement of a commercial development plan, wherein the patent
applicant would have to lay out a proposal by which it planned to develop
and provide access to a technology that was clearly lifesaving.76 This would

74

See discussion infra Part II, Section B(2)(a). Additionally, the method has gained
sufficient prominence such that other scholars have detailed several different types of
licensing suggestions, approaches, mechanisms, or options that are useful to consider for
publicly funded research entities. See, e.g., Roose-Snyder & Doyle, supra note 29.
75
Black, supra note 10, at 434 (“[W]orking requirements are similar to compulsory
licensing and statutory invalidity. Under these schemes, a patentee must make reasonable
efforts to bring a technology to market or face compulsory licensing or statutory
invalidity.”). Statutory invalidity in this case refers to having the patent protections
voided by declaring the patent invalid as a matter of law for failure to meet specified
criteria. While working requirements are discussed in this article in the context of
licensing agreements, the practice could just as easily be included as part of the patent
statutes, and the same conditions could be imposed because the subject matter is of a
certain classification.
76
This idea also comes primarily from an article on possible changes to patent licensing
procedures that would improve access. Benton C. Martin, The American Models of
Technology Transfer: Contextualized Emulation by Developing Countries?, 6 BUFF.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 104, 129 (2009) (“[L]egislation could even require that Commercial
Development Plans for technology that may have a potential lifesaving effect include a
provision for how the licensee is going to make the technology available to the lowincome population.”). In fact, the article goes on to note that statutorily imposed
Commercial Development plans already exist in patent licensing contexts. Id. at 129
n.159 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 209(a)(3)) (“A Federal agency may grant an exclusive or
partially exclusive license on a federally owned invention . . . only if . . . the applicant
makes a commitment to achieve practical application of the invention within a reasonable
time, which time may be extended by the agency upon the applicant’s request and the
applicant’s demonstration that the refusal of such extension would be unreasonable.”).
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grant a typical patent monopoly but would provide a mechanism for holding
corporations accountable to proposed plans that provide improved
humanitarian access. If the patent holder failed to make reasonable efforts to
see this plan through, the patent office, court, or other appointed
government entity would have the power to void the patent, thereby
allowing other parties to provide access.77 Such plans have the added
benefit of both the patent holder and the patent grantor being involved in
setting the terms; having negotiated ahead of time, both sides are more
likely to honor the agreement instead of litigating the validity of the
authorization, as is likely to happen in compulsory licensing contexts.78
c) Non-Patent Law Alternatives
A completely different approach to improving access by modifying the
basic exchange of patent law is to change the underlying incentives by
either partially obviating the need for existing patent rights or outright
eliminating them. A prize-based model can do either,79 while an opensource model only performs the latter function.80 Prizes can be either
implemented in tandem with or in place of standard patent regimes because
they offer a distinct incentive to invent: the prize-based model provides a
one-time economic reward payment for the donation of knowledge to the
public realm.81 The first entity to achieve a certain advance or develop and

77
This example is based on a licensing example of a working requirement. Id. at 129
(“Requiring Commercial Development Plans . . . would grant a licensee full rights to the
technology, but would provide research institutions a mechanism for holding
corporations accountable to proposed access plans. . . . Under a Commercial
Development Plan approach, if the licensee failed to take reasonable efforts to see this
plan through, the research institution is not left . . . with media and public pressure as its
enforcement mechanism. Instead, the research institution would have the power to void
the license and issue a new license to [a] party who would provide access.”).
78
Id. at 129–30 (“This approach would also require upfront honesty about provisions for
access to low-income populations during the licensing process, which may address the
transparency concerns raised by scholars.”).
79
See generally Ilg, supra note 16; see generally Weilbaecher, supra note 44, at 302–04.
80
Weilbaecher, supra note 44, at 302–04.
81
Ilg, supra note 16, at 151.
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donate a particular lifesaving technology is thus rewarded by a lump sum
for completing the technology instead of having to rely solely on
recuperating development costs through selling the advance at the highest
price during the monopoly patent protection period.82 Accordingly, the
technology becomes more affordable on the market, and access to it is
improved. Although securing sufficient sources of prize money to actually
motivate the development or donation of lifesaving technology could be
problematic, prizes are useful in that they provide predictability; developers
can be sure that the technology is actually desired by the public because a
specified amount has been set aside for it.83 Thus, even if prizes are not
ultimately implemented as a solution to the access problem, they provide a
helpful lesson: before rewarding an entity for developing a technology for a
humanitarian context, ideally some method should be used to verify that the
public sector has a need for it.
An open-source model, on the other hand, completely eliminates
exclusionary patent rights. An open-source response refers to
“collaborative, community-based initiatives where the components of the
project are made available to all and can be modified by all, such that
individual members re-contribute to the larger project.”84 This approach
relies on an entirely different set of incentives than the usual profit incentive
of monopolies: participants are mostly unpaid volunteers who “donate their
time and expertise for the satisfaction of contributing to the solution of a
large, complex problem and peer-recognition for having done so.”85 As
such, open-source models often operate as alternatives outside of the typical
framework of patent law regulations; open-source initiatives are often not

82
83
84
85

Id.
Id.
Weilbaecher, supra note 44, at 286.
Id. at 287.
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patented after the fact, but enter directly into the public domain.86 While
specific examples like the Human Genome Project have certainly been
successful,87 the open-source approach is likely to only help promote access
in two non-patent areas: non-patentable compounds and rare diseases.88
However, open-source models do demonstrate the importance of promoting
collaboration when trying to develop new solutions to the access-innovation
dichotomy.
2. Legislation
Several of the above-mentioned approaches to remedying the access gap
have actually been implemented to some degree through legislation. The
following examples have found a significant discussion base in scholarship,
and are important background for the access discussion.
a) Bayh-Dole Act
In 1980, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act.89 To avoid or minimize the
occurrence of government-funded technologies sitting on a shelf and not
finding practical application, the Act granted research institutions

86

Id. at 290 (“Open source drugs would not be patented; rather, the drug itself would
enter the public domain for generic manufacturers to produce. This helps achieve the goal
of bringing new medicines to people who need them, at the lowest possible price.”).
87
Id. at 288 (“The international effort to sequence the human genome, known as the
Human Genome Project, resembled an open source initiative by placing all of the
resulting data in the public domain rather than allowing any individual researcher to
patent the results.”).
88
Id. at 288 (“Open source . . . may be effective in two areas. One is in the development
of non-patentable compounds or drugs whose patents have expired. Since discovery
involving these drugs and compounds cannot be protected, nor can they garner large
profits, developers generally are less interested in pursuing research in these areas. The
second is in the area of neglected diseases because there is not a large enough market of
paying customers to justify the expense involved in developing a new drug.”).
89
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Pub L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015-28 (1980) (codified as amended
at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211, 301-307 (1994). The Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation
Act (passed in the same year as the Bayh-Dole Act) also deals with government-funded
research. For a more detailed review of that legislation, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public
Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in GovernmentSponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1705–09 (1996).

VOLUME 10 • ISSUE 1 • 2011

429

430 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

permission to take title and sell technologies to private industry, with a
mandate to bring the invention to practical application.90 Regarding the
access gap, this Act corresponds most closely to the “Leveraging Public
Scientific Capital” approach described supra in Part II, Section B(1)(b).
Before the passage of the Act, “previous legislation had typically
encouraged or required that federal agencies sponsoring research make the
results widely available to the public through government ownership or
dedication to the public domain.”91 However, the Act authorized
“universities and government agencies to patent and capitalize on their own
research,” and “[u]niversities now own significant intellectual property
rights that are licensed to pharmaceutical and biotech companies and are
developed into lifesaving health innovations.”92 Additionally, the Act
“allowed and encouraged small businesses and nonprofit organizations to
patent the results of government-sponsored research, provided that they
satisfy certain statutorily defined conditions.”93
Regarding the mechanisms available to the government agencies to direct
the use of the inventions after they are licensed to commercializing entities,
Peter Lee explains:
First, under 35 U.S.C. § 202(a), a funding agency can prohibit a
grantee from patenting an invention in “exceptional
circumstances” when the agency determines that such action “will
better promote the policy and objectives” of the Act. Second, the
federal government retains a “paid-up license to practice, or have
practiced” on its behalf, any invention subject to the Act. Third,
agencies may exercise so-called “march-in rights” to compulsorily
license subject inventions if certain statutorily defined factors are
met. Notably, the second of these criteria explicitly permits marchin rights when “action is necessary to alleviate health or safety
needs which are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor,
90
91
92
93

Martin, supra note 76, at 105.
Eisenberg, supra note 89, at 1663.
Roose-Snyder & Doyle, supra note 29, at 283.
Lee, supra note 30, at 951.
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assignee, or their licensees.” . . . [B]y regulation, patents covered
by the Act must state that “this invention was made with
government support. . . . The government has certain rights in the
invention.”94
The Act has also been praised for bringing about significant change. “The
number of patents filed and licensing agreements signed by universities
nearly doubled between 1993 and 2003.”95 “Prior to legislation, less than 4
percent of the tens of thousands of government-funded inventions were
licensed to industry, resulting in many technologies failing to reach
practical application.”96 However, “currently, multiple types of research
institutions in the United States negotiate an increasing number of licenses
every year, resulting in the issuance of more patents and the disclosure of
more inventions to technology transfer offices.”97 Furthermore, “[e]ven
scholars who believe this growth would have occurred eventually without
the . . . Act agree that the legislation was important because it “accelerated
this growth by clarifying ownership rules, by making these activities
bureaucratically easier to administer, and by changing norms toward
patenting and licensing at universities.”98
b) TRIPS
Among the most prominent governmental actions taken that addresses the
access problem is the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
Agreement (TRIPS). Regarding the access gap, this agreement corresponds
to the “compulsory licensing” approach described supra p. 420. In short,
TRIPS “allows for the grant of compulsory licenses to combat national
health emergencies or other circumstances of extreme urgency.”99 Much
scholarship has been produced on the intricacies of TRIPS and the
94
95
96
97
98
99

Id. at 954.
Roose-Snyder & Doyle, supra note 29, at 283.
Martin, supra note 76, at 104.
Id.
Id.
Tsai, supra note 53, at 1064.
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subsequent legislation it has prompted. As such, it is worth summarizing
that history here.
In 1994, the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements were signed
at the end of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations.100 Included in the
Final Act of the new WTO Agreement was the TRIPS Agreement.101
Effective January 1, 1995, TRIPS required all WTO member-nations to
meet minimum intellectual property protection standards in their laws and
practices.102 Representing the need-for-incentive side of the innovation
dichotomy, the United States, the European Union, and Japan pushed for
the passage of TRIPS as a means of strengthening patent law protection,
reflecting the increasing importance of their knowledge-based industries in
the global economy.103 Characterizing the need-for-access side of the
innovation dichotomy, developing and least-developed nations accepted the
passage of TRIPS, seeking freer access to agricultural markets and
participation in the WTO trade system.104 Accordingly, TRIPS not only
strengthened international intellectual property protection and established
new patterns of patent protection, but also provided some mechanisms of
exception to patent protection to help developing countries adjust to the new
intellectual property regime.105
Article 31 of TRIPS outlines one such mechanism: the compulsory
license.106 The license is intended to allow generic versions of patented
drugs to be manufactured without a patent owner’s authorization.107 Subject
to the requirements found in Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement,
100
Fanni (Faina) Weitsman, Eliminating Barriers to the Export of Generic Versions of
Patented Drugs to Developing Countries—From Doha to Bill C-9, 6 ASPER REV. INT’L
BUS. & TRADE L. 103, 105 (2006).
101
Id. at 103.
102
Tsai, supra note 53, at 1064.
103
Id. at 1067.
104
Id.
105
Weitsman, supra note 100, at 103.
106
Id.
107
Id.
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governments have the right to issue compulsory licenses to allow
companies to produce a patented product, or to use a patented process,
without the permission of the patent owner.108 However, Article 31(f)
restricts licenses to those that are “predominantly for the supply of the
domestic market of the Member authorizing such use,” thus limiting the
amount of the product that can be exported to a needy country under the
license.109 As a result, less-developed countries lacking the actual capacity
to manufacture pharmaceuticals domestically were effectively unable to
import any significant quantity of cheaper generics from drug-producing
nations where pharmaceuticals were under patent.110
In March 2001, tensions over this restrictive mechanism came to a head
when forty-one global pharmaceutical companies filed a lawsuit against
South Africa, contesting a South African law that provided for enhanced
access to patented drugs.111 The South African Medicines Act authorized
the South African health minister to issue compulsory licenses in addition to
his preexisting authority to allow parallel imports of pharmaceutical
products when public health was at stake.112 While the pharmaceutical
companies eventually dropped the lawsuit amidst intense criticism, the case
generated significant public focus on the issue of compulsory licensing and
access to essential medicines.113 “Developed countries . . . maintained that
high levels of IP protection are the best means of increasing access to
medicines by promoting investment in research and development, whereas
108

Cann, supra note 13, at 817.
Id. (emphasis added).
110
Id.
111
Tsai, supra note 53, at 1068–69; Lee, supra note 30, at 932 n.73 (citing Pharm. Mfrs.
Ass’n v. President of the Republic of S. Africa, Case No. 4183/98 (High Court of South
Africa, Transvaal Provincial Division)).
112
Tsai, supra note 53, at 1068–69; Lee, supra note 30, at 932 n.73 (citing Pharm. Mfrs.
Ass’n v. President of the Republic of S. Africa, Case No. 4183/98 (High Court of South
Africa, Transvaal Provincial Division)).
113
Tsai, supra note 53, at 1068–69; Lee, supra note 30, at 932 n.73 (citing Pharm. Mfrs.
Ass’n v. President of the Republic of S. Africa, Case No. 4183/98 (High Court of South
Africa, Transvaal Provincial Division)).
109
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lesser developed countries . . . argued that the strict limitations of the TRIPS
Agreement . . . overly restricted users’ interests in pharmaceutical
technology, especially in the context of health crises.”114
In November 2001, shortly after the suit against South Africa, the WTO
held its Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, to clarify issues
related to the implementation of TRIPS.115 At the conclusion of the
conference, the ministers signed the “Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health” (hereinafter “the Doha Declaration”).116 The first three
paragraphs of the Doha Declaration specifically cite the gravity of public
health problems in the least-developed countries, the importance of TRIPS,
and the tension between incentives to develop and corresponding product
prices. The fourth paragraph proceeds to affirm that TRIPS “can and should
be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members’
right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to
medicines for all.”117 In the sixth paragraph, the ministers recognized that
114

Tsai, supra note 53, at 1067.
Weitsman, supra note 100, at 103–05; The Doha Declaration Explained, WORLD
TRADE
ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dohaexplained_e.htm (last visited Apr. 2,
2011); The Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/min01_e.htm (last visited Apr.
2, 2011).
116
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Pub.
Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755, 755 (Nov. 14, 2001), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/min01_e.htm#declarations
[hereinafter WTO Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS]. The “Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health” (referred to as “the Doha Declaration” in this article)
should not be confused with the Doha Ministerial Declaration. Both declarations were
signed November 14, 2001, as products of the Ministerial Conference. However, the
Doha Ministerial Declaration was the overarching declaration summarizing the entire
work of the conference, while the Doha Declaration was a more specific declaration
targeting the access problem, couched in terms of public health. While the Doha
Declaration provides the basis for subsequent enactments, some access-related
scholarship does reference the Doha Ministerial Declaration as a source for more detail
concerning the objectives and policy surrounding the Doha Declaration. See, e.g.,
Weitsman, supra note 100, at 103–05.
117
WTO Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS, supra note 116.
115
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“WTO members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the
pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of
compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement.”118 The Doha
Declaration called for the Council for TRIPS to find and report to the
General Council on a solution no later than the end of 2002.119
On August 30, 2003, the WTO General Council issued a decision
adopting the solution that the Council for TRIPS had reported.120 Referred
to as “the 30 August Decision,”121 the WTO decision “waived members’
obligations under Article 31(f) of TRIPS and allowed generic versions of
patented drugs to be exported, under certain conditions, to developing
countries that had insufficient manufacturing capacities.”122 This interim
waiver is applicable until the TRIPS Agreement is formally amended.123
The accompanying statement by the General Council’s chairperson
mandates that such a waiver system should be used “in good faith to protect
public health” and not as an “instrument to pursue industrial or commercial
policy objectives.”124
In a very thorough review of TRIPS and its implementation,125 Wesley A.
Cann, Jr. describes the formalities required by the waiver:

118

Id.
Id.
120
General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 and Corr.l (Aug. 30, 2003), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm.
121
This article uses the terminology of Tsai, supra note 53, at 1066. Other scholarship
employs other titles.
122
Weitsman, supra note 100, at 104.
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Cann, supra note 13, at 817–18.
124
Id.
125
For Mr. Cann’s extensive and detailed look at wiggle room, imprecision, vague
definitions, particularly pertinent clauses (including an analysis of the language
“necessary” in Article 73’s security exception to obligations under the treaty), and
specific strategies to use the language of the TRIPS agreement and reliance on health
reasons to justify a country’s evasion, breach, or ignoring of common IP protocol, see
Cann, supra note 13.
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The [30 August] Decision requires an eligible importing Member
to make a notification to the Council for TRIPS that specifies the
names and expected quantities of the products to be imported and
confirms (if not a “least-developed” country) that the importing
Member “has established that it has insufficient or no
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector” for those
products. The compulsory license issued by the exporting Member
must indicate that only the amount necessary to meet the needs of
the importing country will be manufactured under the license and
that the entirety of this production will be exported to the eligible
Member. Additionally, “adequate remuneration” shall be paid in
the exporting Member to the patent holder taking into account the
“economic value to the importing Member of the use that has been
authorized.” All Members are directed to take reasonable measures
to prevent the re-exportation of the products produced under these
licenses, and to ensure effective legal means for the prevention of
diversion.126
To determine the royalty to be paid as “adequate remuneration,” the Use
of Patented Products for International Humanitarian Purposes Regulations
provides a formulation based on the Scheduled Country’s ranking on the
United Nations Human Development Index (UNHDI); the lower the
scheduled country’s rank, the lower the royalty to be paid.127
With this waiver system in place, several countries implemented
domestic legislation to allow the export of patented drugs to developing
countries. For example, in May 2004, Canada became one of the first WTO
member nations to enact legislation reflecting the 30 August Decision by
amending its patent laws with the passage of Canada’s Access to Medicines
Regime (CAMR).128 CAMR provisions are codified as part of the Patent
Act in Section 21 of the Consolidated Statutes of Canada and also
references Part C of the Canadian Food and Drug Regulations.129 A
126

Id. at 818.
Penner & Narayanan, supra note 27, at 464–65.
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manufacturer seeking to apply for an export authorization under CAMR
must apply to the therapeutic products directorate of Health Canada, the
agency that governs CAMR compliance.130
Specifically, such an authorized manufacturer is approved to:
[M]ake, construct and use a patented invention solely for purposes
directly related to the manufacture of the pharmaceutical product
named in the application and to sell it or export to a country or
WTO Member that is listed in any of Schedules 2 to 4 and that is
named in the application. 131
The granted authorization is valid for a period of two years, and is
nonexclusive, nontransferable, and renewable for a further two-year
period.132 In their overview of the CAMR133 legislation, Penner and
Narayanan summarize Schedules 2 to 4 as setting out three sets of
enumerated countries (“Scheduled Countries”) as follows:
a.

any country recognized by the United Nations as being a
“least-developed country,” whether or not it is a WTO
Member country (a Schedule 2 Country);

b.

a WTO Member country that has indicated that it intends to
import drugs needed only in a national or other extreme
emergency (a Schedule 3 Country); and

c.

any WTO Member or non-WTO Member not listed in
either Schedule 2 or 3 and which is identified by the
Organisation [sic] for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) as eligible for development
assistance, has provided notice of a national emergency
and lack of capacity, agrees that the drug will not be used
for commercial purposes, and undertakes to adopt the

130

Id.
Penner & Narayanan, supra note 27, at 461–62.
132
Id.
133
Penner and Narayanan refer to the legislation as “the Pledge to Africa Act,” reflecting
the legislation’s working title from when it was still a bill, “An Act to Amend the Patent
Act and the Food & Drugs Act” (The Jean Chretien Pledge to Africa). Id. at 461.
131
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measures referred to in the General Council Decision (a
Schedule 4 Country).134
One important distinction not readily discernable from the schedules is
that “when an importing country is not a WTO member and is not listed in
the Schedules of eligible importing countries,” the country is subject to an
additional requirement before being allowed to invoke CAMR: the country
must declare “a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency.”135
The remuneration formula prescribed by CAMR to compensate patent
holders is “related to the UN Human Development Index (UNHDI) and sets
the highest rate of remuneration at 4 percent and the lowest at 0.02
percent.”136 However, an exception to this scheme is available in Section
21.08 (4)–(7), wherein the patent holder can request a royalty payment
increase from a Canadian Federal Court if the royalty “‘is not an adequate
remuneration for the use of invention,’ taking into account humanitarian
and non-commercial grounds for issuing a license and economic value of
the use of invention to the importing country.”137 To later terminate a
compulsory license granted under CAMR, a patent holder must apply to the
Canadian Federal Court on the grounds that the prospective compulsive
licensee has failed to provide the necessary information, that the exported
product has been used improperly, or that the exported product has become
“commercial in nature.”138 Authorization may also terminate automatically
“when certain conditions have been met” or if “the Commissioner notifies
the applicant that the exported products do not meet the requirements of the
Food & Drugs Act and its regulations.”139

134

Id. at 462–463.
Weitsman, supra note 100, at 120.
136
Id. at 130.
137
Id.
138
Penner & Narayanan, supra note 27, at 465.
139
Id.
135
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Near the same time that Canada enacted CAMR, Norway enacted
legislation in response to the 30 August Decision and amended its Patent
Regulations on May 14, 2004.140 “Norwegian regulations do not require that
an importing non-WTO member country declare a health emergency
situation in order to be eligible to import generic drugs under a compulsory
license.”141 The Norwegian legislation “does not provide any clear way of
assessing the appropriate remuneration[,] . . . [but instead merely] follows
the vague language of the WTO General Council’s decision on the
matter.”142
India also has legislation implementing the 30 August Decision.
However, it is vague and “gave only a general permit to export patented
pharmaceutical products to countries with inadequate production capacities
and in order to cope with public health emergencies.”143
The European Union’s response to the 30 August Decision coalesced in
July 2005 when the European Union Committee on International Trade
published a final report regarding regulations proposed by the European
Parliament and Council.144 The proposal specifically dealt with regulations
for “compulsory licensing of patents relating to the manufacture of
pharmaceutical products for export to countries with public health
problems.”145 These draft regulations only apply to WTO member
countries.146 Regarding adequate remuneration, the draft also mirrors the
nonspecific language of the 30 August Decision, much like the Norwegian
legislation.147

140

Weitsman, supra note 100, at 133.
Id.
142
Id. at 133–34.
143
Id. at 134.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 135.
141
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In December 2004, the Netherlands responded to the 30 August Decision
by enacting “[p]olicy rules on issuing compulsory licenses.”148 “An
interesting and distinguishing feature of this legislation is that for the first
time, [nongovernmental organizations] are considered potential applicants,
if acting for one state or for a group of states.”149
Even though various countries have implemented legislation to improve
access to medication within the framework established by TRIPS and
subsequent modifications, the TRIPS framework still suffers from several
problems. The framework is plagued by confusion and a lack of clarity: an
exporter that tries to provide generics under this framework would likely be
unsure of its legal obligations due to the variation from country to country
in definitions, royalty rates, and preliminary conditions that must be met
before distribution may be made to a given country. Additionally, the
framework suffers from a fundamental fairness problem. The compulsory
licenses have been introduced long after the patents were issued; this
introduction changes the rules and modifies the meaning of patent
protection while the patent is still in force, which unfairly changes the legal
ramifications of an action already taken.
One way to resolve these issues is to adjust the process for receiving new
patents and to root the access improvements in those adjustments instead of
in compulsory licenses. This approach would provide one standardized set
of procedures in lieu of several international interpretations, thereby
resolving clarity issues. It would also provide a clear method of determining
rights and obligations prior to patent issuance, thereby resolving the
fairness issue. The primary potential challenge in capturing these benefits is
simply determining how exactly to implement such an approach.

148
149

Id.
Id.
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C. A Call for a New HOPE: Humanitarian-Objective Patent Endorsement
Classification
Most of the above-proposed solutions offer ways to address the access
problem by adjusting the innovation dichotomy balance with a way around
the current patent system (for instance, by limiting otherwise expected
rights or imposing requirements after the patent is already issued). Other
proposed solutions seek to develop an alternate approach independent of the
system. Most are taking an after-the-fact approach, modifying incentives or
access by adjusting what patent protection provides for already-granted
patents. By taking an opposite, before-the-fact approach and looking at
options that could be implemented before a patent is granted, another useful
tool to address the access disparity could be developed.
This tool could encourage innovation and improve access by affecting the
issuance of the patent in the first place, therefore addressing the preissuance prosecution of patents (application process) instead of focusing on
post-issuance patent litigation (the enforcement of patent rights in court).150
A new subset of rules in the patent prosecution process that offers
prosecution benefits in exchange for partial restrictions that do not
completely destroy an innovator’s ability to charge a premium in the
primary market could provide a compromise between the socially just
desire to make new technology affordable for humanitarian purposes and
the economic need to make innovation profitable. Such a tool would
simultaneously provide substantial benefits for society and for businesses.
Society would receive the benefit of faster and more extensive access to

150

This prosecution and litigation distinction merits further explanation. Patent
prosecution is the process by which a patent is initially issued. It involves correspondence
between the representatives of the inventor and the patent office and often lasts between
two and five years before a patent is issued or finally denied. GARY MYERS, PRINCIPLES
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: A CONCISE HORNBOOK 7 (2008). Litigation
generally refers to lawsuits filed after the patent has finally issued in which the patent
holder exerts the right given by the patent by filing infringement suits against others that
are using the invention.
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humanitarian technology for those that most desperately need it, and
businesses that are developing the humanitarian technology would receive a
means to avoid the primary problems encountered in the patent system.
The primary problems with the patent prosecution process are that it is
tedious, slow, and expensive. The process is tedious due to its extensive
correspondence between a patent agent and a patent examiner. It begins
when, on behalf of an inventor, a patent agent (an individual who has
passed a qualifying test administered by the US Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO)) files an application with the USPTO.151 An examiner
responds for the USPTO and evaluates whether or not the invention merits a
patent.152 The examiner sends “office actions” detailing problems with the
application to the agent.153 The agent replies with a “response to office
action” detailing answers to the examiner’s objections.154 This cyclical
correspondence between the patent examiner and the patent agent often lasts
between two and five years before a patent is issued or finally denied.155
Additionally, the USPTO also has an extensive list of fees,156 which quickly
add up.157
A new subset of rules providing prosecution benefits—such as improved
speed, cost, and simplicity—in exchange for improved access could easily
be accomplished through an already-existing patent law mechanism, the
patent classification. A patent classification is a specialized subset of rules
within the patent prosecution framework that can be added to the Manual of

151

Id. at 256–57.
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
See 35 U.S.C. § 41 (2006) amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L.
No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
157
See, e.g., World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], World Patent Report: A Statistical
Review,
51
(2008),
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/patents/931/wipo_pub_931_2008.pdf.
152

STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP

Prosecution Benefits

Patent Examination and Procedure (MPEP)158 when the nature of a
particular subject matter necessitates an individualized set of procedures or
treatment of the subject matter. For example, in response to the special
nature of plant patents and design patents, the USPTO included a distinct
chapter of requirements for each of the two subjects in the MPEP.159 Each
classification must specify the subject matter involved and the rules
governing that area. For example, MPEP 1502 conveys the “Definition of
Design”160 while other sections specify rules regarding required application
elements,161 examination protocol,162 term length,163 review,164 etc.
Similarly, MPEP 1601 specifies “Type of Plants Covered,”165 while
subsequent sections specify rules regarding application elements,166
examination protocol,167 special reports guidelines,168 etc.
Given the otherwise poor access to lifesaving technology in poverty and
disaster situations, a new classification is warranted. The classification
would be aimed at humanitarian contexts, and as such would be called the
Humanitarian-Objective Patent Endorsement, or HOPE Certification.

158

MPEP, supra note 42, at Foreword (“This Manual is published to provide US Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO) patent examiners, applicants, attorneys, agents, and
representatives of applicants with a reference work on the practices and procedures
relative to the prosecution of patent applications before the USPTO. It contains
instructions to examiners, as well as other material in the nature of information and
interpretation, and outlines the current procedures which the examiners are required or
authorized to follow in appropriate cases in the normal examination of a patent
application. The Manual does not have the force of law or the force of the rules in Title
37 of the Code of Federal Regulations.”).
159
Id. §§ 1500, 1600 (Design Patents and Plant Patents, respectively).
160
Id. § 1502.
161
Id. § 1503.
162
Id. § 1504.
163
Id. § 1505.
164
Id. §§ 1510, 1511.
165
Id. § 1601.
166
Id. § 1603.
167
Id. § 1608.
168
Id. § 1609.
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Reflecting the patterns and requirements of plant and design patents, Part
III of this article explores the task of determining an adequate definition for
Humanitarian Objective in HOPE applications, while Part IV explores the
guarantees to access (subsection A) and incentives (subsection B) that
would be implemented by rules for a HOPE Certification.

III. DEFINING HUMANITARIAN SUBJECT MATTER
The nature of the access disparity necessitates a new classification.
People die without lifesaving technology, especially in disaster- and
poverty-stricken areas. However, the subject matter of a new classification
should be narrowly tailored to meet only the greatest and most extreme of
disparities; otherwise, more technologies might be included for special
treatment that do not carry the heavy weight of the highest need for access,
and the classification could be abused. Humanitarian organizations have
traditionally filled the role of identifying and remedying the life-threatening
situations from which affected individuals have the least opportunity to
escape. Accordingly, defining such a classification as having a humanitarian
objective is a good starting point. However, many definitions exist
regarding the extent of humanitarian work. This section briefly discusses
two definitions (from among many available): one from the United States
Code and one from humanitarian relief organizations.169 This section then
169
Definitions from other potential sources (such as dictionaries, case law, patent law
manuals, and law review articles) are not discussed at length in this article because they
are not particularly helpful.
For example, the dictionary definition of “humanitarian” as “having concern for or
helping to improve the welfare and happiness of people” is not helpful because it is far
too broad; all patents could arguably be included within it, considering the close parallel
to the fundamental statement of purpose of intellectual property rights set forth in the
Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution: “to Promote the Progress
of Science and the Useful Arts.” THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE, 931 (Stuart Berg Flexner ed., 2d ed. 1987); Myers, supra note 150, at 7; US
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
At least two cases make tangential references to the definition of “humanitarian” in the
immigration context. Mounkam v. Way, 2007 WL 974102, at *10 (D.Ariz., Mar. 30,
2007) (stating that humanitarian reasons to allow an exception to deportation include
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suggests a definition for the subject matter of a new patent classification
that is broad enough to accomplish the goal of improving access to
lifesaving technology while being sufficiently narrow to guard against
abuse.
Several portions of the United States Code refer to humanitarian aid and
give examples in an attempt to define it.170 In the context of US assistance
to promote reconciliation and recovery from regional conflicts,
humanitarian assistance “means assistance to meet humanitarian needs,
including needs for food, medicine, medical supplies and equipment,
education, and clothing.”171 Similarly, in a foreign relations statute,
humanitarian assistance “means assistance to meet humanitarian needs,
including needs for food, medicine, medical supplies, clothing, and

“past persecution, suffering, or other inhumane treatment,” yet ultimately leaving to a
jury as a question of fact the decision of whether something was humanitarian or not);
Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 352 F.3d 382, 385 (9th Cir. 2003)
(implying that “humanitarian” means “securing the basic necessities for human life”).
Patent law prosecution guidelines include an international classification system to
catalog the subject matter of inventions. MPEP, supra note 42, § 903.09. The
International Classification of Patents for Inventions has eight principle sections, one of
which is “Human Necessities.” Id. This definition was deemed unhelpful because it might
overly constrict the reach of a new classification to the traditional “human necessities” of
agriculture or pharmaceutical innovations instead of extending benefits to any technology
with lifesaving implications in extreme lack-of-access situations.
One law review article surveyed licensing agreements employed by universities trying
to ensure access for their technologies, and clauses in some of these agreements either
defined “humanitarian” or otherwise attempted to delineate what organizations would be
trusted as access providers. Roose-Snyder & Doyle, supra note 29, at 287, 290 (quoting a
University of California at Davis license agreement that defines “Humanitarian Purposes”
as developing or using a technology for the benefit of an “Economically Disadvantaged
Country,” and quoting a Boston University agreement that defined Public Sector as the
sovereign government of a country and other specific organizations). While this article
was useful in modeling the inclusion of specific examples of organizations that would
qualify as “humanitarian,” the definition was not discussed at length because it is
overbroad; it does not include the specific purpose served by the technology.
170
See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 401 (2006); 22 U.S.C. § 2296 (2006); 22 U.S.C. § 7803
(2006).
171
22 U.S.C. § 2296 (2006).
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shelter.”172 There are more specific definitions provided in the context of
humanitarian and civic assistance in conjunction with military operations,
where the term “humanitarian and civic assistance” means any of the
following:
1) Medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary care provided in areas
of a country that are rural or are underserved by medical,
surgical, dental, and veterinary professionals, respectively,
including education, training, and technical assistance related to
the care provided;
2) Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems;
3) Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities;
4) Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.173
While several good examples of lifesaving technology are included in
this definition, it does not include any sort of temporal aspect. If this
definition were implemented in a patent classification, many technologies
could arguably be lifesaving by extension, and—contrary to its intended
purpose—the classification would no longer reach only technologies that
are likely to have an immediate lifesaving effect for those that would
otherwise be deprived access to the technology. The relationship between a
particular technology and the preservation of a life might be too tenuous
under this definition to justify its verbatim adoption for the HOPE
classification.
The United States Code also articulates how the Internal Revenue Service
defines humanitarian donations that result in tax deductibility.174 However,
the tax law focuses on the nonprofit nature of the organizations receiving
such donations, not on the lifesaving effect of what the organization does.175

172

22 U.S.C. § 7803 (2006).
10 U.S.C. § 401 (2006).
174
See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
175
26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2006).
173
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As such, under section 501(c)(3) of the US Internal Revenue Code,
“humanitarian” is defined too broadly within the context of nonprofit
organizations. Thus, while the United States Code may be helpful for
providing examples of humanitarian efforts, a particular definition should
not be drawn straight from these statutes.176
The other particularly helpful sources for an adequate humanitarian
definition are humanitarian relief organizations themselves. The United
Nations organizes its humanitarian efforts through the Office for
Coordinated Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).177 Several definitions and
purpose statements appear throughout OCHA materials, touching on the
fundamental principles of humanitarian organizations. For example, “[t]he
purpose of humanitarian action is to protect life and health and ensure

List of [tax-]exempt corporations . . . (3): Corporations, and any
community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety,
literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international
amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the
provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of
cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures
to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part
of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise
attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in
subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in
(including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public
office.
176

In the Food and Drug Administration context, the Code also provides an
unconventional definition—humanitarian means treating less than 4,000 individuals.
“Devices intended to benefit patients in the treatment and diagnosis of diseases or
conditions that affect fewer than 4,000 individuals in the United States,” qualifying under
this definition means getting certain exemptions from the stricture of the performance
requirements (360d) & premarket approval (360e). 21 U.S.C. § 360j(m) (2006).
177
UNITED
NATIONS
OFF.
FOR
COORDINATED
HUMANITARIAN
AFF.,
http://www.unocha.org (last visited Dec. 13, 2011).
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respect for human beings,”178 and “[h]umanitarian aid workers strive to
provide life-saving assistance to the increasing number of people affected
by man-made and natural disasters every year,”179 These statements help
ground the word “humanitarian” in addressing the most disparate access
gap contexts. OCHA establishes that humanitarian aid is based on a
“respect for human beings” that should focus on “protect[ing] life and
health” by “provid[ing] life-saving assistance” in the context of poverty and
“natural disasters.”
Combining principles from these various definitions, the definition for a
new patent classification should be:
Humanitarian technology means technology likely to preserve
human life by meeting basic needs that if unmet due to poverty or
disaster would likely ultimately result in death within six months
or be the direct cause of death. Such needs include food, medicine,
medical supplies, sanitation, healthcare, and the like.
Humanitarian agencies are entities situated to best identify the
poverty- or disaster-based need and disseminate corresponding
humanitarian technology accordingly.
Such agencies shall include:
a.

The sovereign government of a country;

b.

Agencies of the United Nations, the World Health
Organization, and the World Bank;

c.

Organizations which are members of the International
Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent;

d.

International charitable agencies (also known as
nongovernmental organizations or NGOs), including but

178

World Humanitarian Day, UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR THE COORDINATION OF
HUMANITARIAN AFF., http://ochaonline.un.org/whd/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2011)
(emphasis added).
179
World
Humanitarian
Day
Background,
UNITED
NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/events/humanitarianday/background.shtml (last visited Dec. 13,
2011) (emphasis added).

STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP

Prosecution Benefits

not limited to Oxfam, Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors
Without Borders), and so forth.
The above definition addresses the concern that the targeted access gap is
generally due to poverty or disaster. Additionally, it sets a timeline to
ensure that technology too distantly related to saving lives is excluded,
while allowing an exception for technology that combats direct but slower
killers, such as HIV/AIDS and deadly illnesses specifically related to
immune systems weakened by HIV/AIDS. It gives examples of what
technology might specifically provide and details organizations that would
be potential consumers and partners in the technology.

IV. RULES FOR A NEW CLASSIFICATION
The rules for the new classification should improve access to the group of
individuals most affected by the access gap: those who have the least ability
to obtain access to the technology and who also are most likely to die
without it. To accomplish this increase in access, the rules governing the
certification should make certain impositions. However, imposing access
improvements without also offering incentive modifications may chill
innovation. As such, incentives must also be granted through the operation
of the rules. Part A below discusses proposed improvements to access while
Part B discusses possible additional incentives that could reestablish the
balance needed in the innovation dichotomy.
A. Guarantees to Access
1. Require Collaboration with Humanitarian Organizations
If the goal of a new certification is to improve access for those
experiencing the greatest access disparity, a mechanism is necessary to
identify those that are in the greatest need with the least access.
Humanitarian organizations have well-established methods of not only
recognizing needs, but also of addressing them with appropriate resources.
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Since humanitarian organizations already have the infrastructure in place to
both identify needs and disseminate responsive resources, requiring
partnership between them and potential patent holders of humanitarian
technology is an efficient mechanism to distribute the technology.
a) Evidence of Agreement
The most appropriate way to ensure such a partnership would be by
contract. The HOPE application rules could require a copy of a contract
showing the applicant’s partnership with a humanitarian organization. Such
a contract would require the patent holder to provide the humanitarian
organization with the technology at cost or at a minimal profit.180 The
contract could also be of an output or requirement variety, obligating the
patent holder to provide the humanitarian organization with a certain
percentage of the patent holder’s production or certain amounts reflecting
the quantity that the humanitarian organization expects to be able to
distribute or utilize. Of course, this contractual obligation would be
contingent upon actual issuance of the patent to protect the inventor from an
unfair obligation should the patent not be issued. However, it could provide
valuable assurance that access to the new technology will be made available
through humanitarian agencies to those who most desperately need it.
b) Affidavit Certifying Humanitarian Use
An additional partnership dynamic would be to require the humanitarian
organization to submit an affidavit explaining the expected humanitarian
use of the technology. This would assist the examiner in verifying that the
technology meets the subject matter definition and would provide a
safeguard against potential distribution abuse by humanitarian
organizations.
180

Examples of anywhere from 0.5 to 4 percent profit exist from compulsory licensing
under TRIPS. Peter Maybardule & Sarah Rimmingto, Compulsory Licenses: A Tool to
Improve Global Access to the HPV Vaccine?, 35 AM. J. L. & MED. 323, 347 (2009).
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2. Accountability
To ensure that humanitarian organizations can continue to receive the
benefit of such an agreement, sufficient measures for accountability would
need to be included to guard against potential breach of the agreement by
the inventor before the access improvements could be realized.
a) Adjustment of Fee Schedule
One such accountability measure would be to adjust the fee schedule
required to maintain a patent. A patent holder must pay a fee at 3.5 years,
7.5 years, and 11.5 years after the issuance of a patent or lose his or her
patent monopoly and exclusionary rights.181 If a HOPE patent holder
showed evidence of honoring the agreement, the fee could be reduced or
waived. On the other hand, if a HOPE patent holder willfully breached the
patent, the fee schedule could impose a penalty increase.
b) Modify Patent Rights
Another potential accountability measure would be to make patent
exclusivity contingent on good faith performance of the agreement. For
example, if a humanitarian organization can show that the patent holder has
neglected the agreement, the resulting punishment can be to allow the
organization to engage in compulsory licensing against the patent holder or
to revoke the patent all together.
B. Incentives
To balance the access provisions, incentives are necessary for the
inventor to agree182 to restrict what would otherwise be a complete
181

37 C.F.R. § 1.20(e)–(g) (2011).
The choice to engage in this exchange is important. While a new classification could
be imposed in such a manner that any humanitarian technology must comport with HOPE
requirements to receive a patent (akin to any plant matter being subject to the specific
plant patent rules), the better option is to allow patent applicants to opt in to the
certification (akin to making a patent “special,” which only occurs when a patent

182
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monopoly over the technology. While most of the proposed incentives
provide advantages in the patent prosecution process, other incentives
include tax write-offs, continued market monopoly, and public relations.
1. Benefits Within the Patent Prosecution Process
As is the case with many administrative processes, the principal
complaints of patent prosecution are that the process is too slow, difficult,
and/or expensive. As such, the primary advantages that would appeal to an
applicant engaging in the patent prosecution process would be to make the
process faster, easier, and less expensive. These three advantages are easily
and justifiably includable in the current patent prosecution process for the
HOPE Certification.
a) Expediting the Process (Making it Faster)
“New patent applications are normally taken up for examination in the
order of their United States filing date.”183 However, the USPTO has a
procedure for requesting accelerated examination called a “petition to make
special.”184 If the USPTO grants a request to make an application “special,”
that application will be processed out of turn and examined in advance of
other applications.185 The “appropriate showing” necessary for the USPTO
to grant a request to make an application “special” requires an applicant to
establish that the application fits within a select number of exception
categories.186 “The exceptions are created to expedite business or to serve

applicant elects to pursue that course). The extra level of choice is likely to increase the
likelihood that the HOPE patent recipients would actually honor the agreement,
generating an effect much like the pre-negotiated terms discussed in the context of
leveraging public scientific capital.
183
Changes to Practice for Petitions in Patent Applications to Make Special and for
Accelerated Examination, 71 Fed. Reg 36323-01 (June 26, 2006).
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id.
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an important purpose for public service.”187 The decision to include a new
exception rests with the director of the USPTO, although the president or
other department heads can also request a new exception.188
The existing exception categories found in the MPEP are:
1) Manufacture (invention is ready for manufacture);
2) Infringement (invention is being infringed);
3) Applicant’s Health (is poor and in danger of death before
finishing application);
4) Applicant’s Age (is 65 or over, similar reasoning to 3);
5) Environmental Quality (significantly contributes to restoration
or maintenance of the basic life-sustaining natural elements,
e.g., air, water, and soil);
6) Energy (contributes to the discovery or development of energy
resources or more efficient utilization of energy);
7) Recombinant DNA (developments in the area of recombinant
deoxyribonucleic acid, which “[appear] to have extraordinary
potential benefit for mankind”); 189
187

(a) Applications will not be advanced out of turn for examination or for
further action except as provided by this part, or upon order of the
Director to expedite the business of the Office, or upon filing of a request
under paragraph (b) of this section or upon filing a petition under
paragraphs (c) or (d) of this section with a showing which, in the opinion
of the Director, will justify so advancing it.
(b) Applications wherein the inventions are deemed of peculiar
importance to some branch of the public service and the head of some
department of the Government requests immediate action for that reason,
may be advanced for examination.
37 C.F.R. § 1.102(a)–(b) (2011).
188

For example, President Ronald Reagan directed the USPTO to permit accelerated
examination of applications relating to superconductivity. Ned A. Israelsen, Making,
Using, and Selling Without Infringing: An Examination of 35 U.S.C. Section 271(E) and
the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 457, 478 n.70
(1989) (citing MPEP § 708.02(VII) (5th ed., Rev. 6, Oct. 1987)).
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8) New Applications—Accelerated Examination (requiring a more
onerous application process, discussed infra p. 455;
9) Superconductivity;
10) Inventions relating to HIV/AIDS and Cancer;
11) Countering Terrorism;190 and
12) Applications Relating to Biotechnology Filed by Applicants
who are Small Entities.191
Humanitarian technology would fit reasonably within this list. It fits
squarely within the mandate that exceptions must “expedite business or . . .
serve an important purpose for public service”192 because it would expedite
the business interactions between inventors and humanitarian organizations
and serve an important purpose for public service by saving lives through
improved access. Furthermore, just as countering terrorism would seem to
have as its primary goal preserving human life, so too would a humanitarian
technology exception. While it could be argued that the exception for
“[i]nventions relating to HIV/AIDS and cancer”193 makes the proposed
189

MPEP, supra note 42, at § 708.02(VII) (“This field might lead to ways of controlling
or treating cancer and hereditary defects . . . [and] has possible applications in agriculture
and industry.”).
190
MPEP, supra note 42, at § 708.02. International terrorism is defined as including
activities that[:] (A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life
that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any
State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the
jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; [and] (B) appear to be
intended[:] (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii)
to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping.
18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2006).
191

All of the exceptions listed in this paragraph are found in MPEP, supra note 42,
§ 708.02.
192
37 C.F.R. § 1.102(a)–(b) (2011) (“(b) Applications wherein the inventions are
deemed of peculiar importance to some branch of the public service and the head of some
department of the Government requests immediate action for that reason, may be
advanced for examination.”).
193
MPEP, supra note 42, § 708.02.
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humanitarian technology exception moot, the humanitarian technology
exception would capture a substantially larger field. The humanitarian
technology exception could either subsume the HIV/AIDS and cancer
exception, or it could stand alongside it, thereby giving an applicant the
option to pursue only an expedited application or an expedited application
with the other attendant advantages of a HOPE Certification.
b) Simplifying the Process (Making it Easier)
At first, the accelerated examination exception for new applications looks
like it may obviate the use for a HOPE acceleration exception. However, a
closer inspection shows that a HOPE application would provide a simpler
expediting process than the exception for new applications.
The exception for new applications requires a more onerous application
process than a standard application.194 Dirk Thomas, Chandran Iyer, and
Aziz Burgy explain the requirements and process for applying for
accelerated examination under the new application exception:
1) File the application, petition, and required fees
electronically using the USPTO’s electronic filing system
(EFS);
2) File a complete, nonreissue utility or design application
with three or fewer independent claims and twenty or fewer
total claims directed to a single invention;
3) Agree to an interview (including an interview before a first
Office action) whenever requested by the Examiner to
discuss the prior art and rejections or objections;

194

See Elizabeth Peters, Are We Living in a Material World?: An Analysis of the Federal
Circuit’s Materiality Standard Under the Patent Doctrine of Inequitable Conduct, 93
IOWA L. REV. 1519, 1550 (2008) (“Unlike the normal PTO application procedure, where
applicants must disclose only information they knew about at the time of application, an
applicant under the new procedure must conduct a thorough prior-art search and
affirmatively state a good-faith belief that the prior-art search was completed properly.”).
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4) Provide a statement that a pre-examination search195 was
conducted of US patents and patent application
publications, foreign patent documents, and nonpatent
literature;
5) Agree not to separately argue the patentability of any
dependent claim during any appeal of the application; and
6) Provide, at the time of filing, an accelerated examination
support document with
a.

an information disclosure statement (IDS) in
compliance with 37 C.F.R. § 1.98 citing each
reference deemed most closely related to the
subject matter of each of the claims;

b.

an identification of all the limitations in the claims
that are disclosed by the reference, specifying
where the limitation is disclosed in the cited
reference;

c.

a detailed explanation of how each of the claims is
patentable over the references cited with the
particularity required by 37 C.F.R. § 1.111(b) and
(c);

d.

a concise statement of the utility of the invention
as defined in each of the independent claims
(unless the application is a design application);

195
See Shashank Upadhye, Liar Liar Pants On Fire: Towards A Narrow Construction
For Inequitable Conduct As Applied to the Prosecution of Medical Device and Drug
Patent Applications, 72 UMKC L. REV. 669, 713–714 (2004)

In effect, by so certifying, the applicant is ‘helping’ the Examiner find the
prior art. The Federal Circuit in [General Electric Music Corp. v. Samick
Music Corp.], stated that the required search must be more than just a
casual search, more than just looking in one’s files, more than just talking
to one’s colleagues, and more than just staying within one’s internal
sources.
Id. (referencing Gen. Electric Music Corp. v. Samick Music Corp., 19 F.3d 1405,
1409–1410 (1994)).
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e.

a showing of where each limitation of the claims
finds support under the first paragraph of 35
U.S.C. § 112 in the written description of the
specification; and

f.

identification of any cited references that may be
disqualified as prior art under 35 U.S.C. §
103(c).196

In contrast, under a HOPE application, the applicant would need only to
provide a copy of the contract negotiated with the humanitarian
organization and an affidavit from the humanitarian organization detailing
the expected use. Creating the HOPE acceleration option would allow for
expediting the process without the extra burdens of developing a more
complete record and additional restrictions on prosecution.
c) Fee Adjustment (Making it Less Expensive)
To make the application cheaper, the fees could be adjusted or waived for
a HOPE application. Fees are routinely waived for petitions for expedited
patent prosecution when certain specific conditions are met.197 Fees are also
routinely adjusted for small entity status.198 Considering that the five
196
Dirk Thomas, Chandran Iyer & Aziz Burgy, Slow Down Before Accelerating:
Litigation Ramifications of Accelerated Examination Procedure on Nanotechnology, 4
No. 1 A.B.A. SCITECH LAW. 4, 5 (2007).
197
37 C.F.R. § 1.102(c) (2011):

A [request to expedite an application] may be filed without a fee if the
basis for the petition is:
(1) The applicant’s age or health; or
(2) That the invention will materially:
(i) Enhance the quality of the environment;
(ii) Contribute to the development or conservation of energy
resources; or
(iii) Contribute to countering terrorism.
198

37 C.F.R. § 1.27(b)
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bases199 for waiving fees of petitions to make applications “special” are
circumstances that are particularly in the public interest, the fee associated
with requesting an application be made “special” on a HOPE basis should
also be waived.200 By a similar rationale, subsequent filing and maintenance
fees could also be reduced in a manner similar to the small entity status.
However, since the HOPE certification would not be granted until the
patent is granted, these fee reductions should be accomplished on a
retroactive basis, refunding the applicant the overpayment only once the
certification is granted.
2. Other Incentives
Various other incentives besides prosecution benefits could also be
included in the adjusted exchange of a new classification. For example, tax
write-offs could provide another incentive for an inventor or company to
pursue a HOPE certification. Most humanitarian organizations are taxexempt entities under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c), and therefore any charitable
contributions made to them could count as tax deductible under 26 U.S.C §
170.201 The precise amount that would be considered a charitable

Establishment of small entity status permits payment of reduced fees. (1)
A small entity, as defined in paragraph (a) of this section, who has
properly asserted entitlement to small entity status pursuant to paragraph
(c) of this section will be accorded small entity status by the Office in the
particular application or patent in which entitlement to small entity status
was asserted. Establishment of small entity status allows the payment of
certain reduced patent fees pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 41(h)(1) [50 percent
reduction of most fees].
Id.
199

The five feeless bases are (1) the applicant’s age, (2) the applicant’s health, (3) that the
invention will materially enhance the quality of the environment, (4) that the invention
will materially contribute to the development or conservation of energy resources, or (5)
that the invention will materially contribute to countering terrorism. 37 C.F.R. § 1.102(c).
200
Marc Verzani, The Orphan Patent Act, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 5, 11
(1995).
201
26 U.S.C. §§ 501(c), 170 (2006).
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contribution would need to be determined between the patent holder and the
humanitarian organizations. Potential regimes range from the outright
donation of technology (with a claim for a deduction or credit
corresponding to the cost of the production) to the claim of a portion of the
difference between the market price and the price charged to humanitarian
organizations. If people fear abuse in tax deductions, Congress could enact
new legislation regulating exactly what could be claimed.
Another incentive is the opportunity to develop new revenue streams.
With the HOPE classification aimed at only the greatest access disparity,
the innovator can still charge a premium in the market as usual. Those
unaffected by poverty or disaster that are still able to afford the premium on
intellectual property will continue to do so; the innovator can continue to
count on that profit as an incentive for registering his/her intellectual
property. In addition, the HOPE classification effectively develops a
revenue stream that did not exist before. In the standard market, all
consumers are in the same sphere of supply and demand. Of those who
cannot afford a particular technology, the lack of access to the technology is
only life-threatening to the specific subset of those people that do not have
the means to even afford alternative remedies (i.e., those particularly
affected by disaster or poverty). The HOPE classification would thus not
rob the original market of any customers or profit because those reached
through HOPE processes would never have been able to afford access to
that market. With the introduction of a third-party humanitarian
organization that would not usually be a customer at the market price—but
that is willing to pay a reduced price to subsidize the cost for the small
subset of the unreached market consisting of disaster- and poverty-stricken
people—the company can actually capture an untapped source of revenue.
In this way, the company could still exploit the very profitable private
market, but add the small profit of the new humanitarian market to it as
well.
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An additional possibility would be to allow or provide term extensions
exclusively for HOPE patents. At a conceptual level, this would give the
patent holder more time to exploit the private market in exchange for the
generation of a humanitarian market. A specific term extension granted
exclusively to HOPE patents would implement the incentives suggested by
wildcard patent terms (as discussed supra p. 417), but solve the
predictability problem for generics. Additionally, by limiting the extension
to a specific type of subject matter and restricting the incentive to the same
technology that receives the improved access, the balance of the innovation
dichotomy is narrowly tailored to a specific innovation instead of applying a
rigid general rule to a specific situation.
Finally, the new classification could also provide a public relations
incentive. An applicant will have a public relations incentive to get a HOPE
patent because it is a certification of contribution to the public good, and it
serves the underprivileged. The opportunity to publicize a company’s
acquisition of a new HOPE patent for a particular technology could allow a
company to improve its public image due to the favorable contribution to
the public good reflected in the certification’s requirements. Going beyond
a mere announcement of its acquisition of a HOPE patent, a company could
further utilize the certification for public relations by boasting about the
number of HOPE patents it holds in its portfolio.

V. CONCLUSION
Implementing the HOPE classification could provide another tool to
address the greater issue of closing the gap of the access disparity that
results from the innovation dichotomy and the current intellectual property
regime. In light of the devastating tsunami in Japan in the spring of 2011,
the continuing aftermath of the catastrophic 2010 earthquake in Haiti, and
the lingering effects of Hurricane Katrina in the United States, incentives to
improve the cost-efficiency of humanitarian aid in disaster situations are
more needed than ever. With the ongoing massive death counts from health
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epidemics such as AIDS or starvation, access to lifesaving technology is
hugely needed in poverty-stricken regions. Even the USPTO has recognized
the pressing current need to provide incentives to pursue humanitarian
activity.202 By implementing a new patent classification that offers new
incentives—such as expediting applications, providing fee adjustments,
employing tax deductions or credits, capturing additional profits, and
establishing goodwill in public relations—the USPTO could inspire a whole
host of businesses to commit to working with humanitarian organizations to
reach poverty- and disaster-stricken people with lifesaving technology. The
result would be something long missing from the patent system: HOPE.

202

Request for Comments on Incentivizing Humanitarian Technologies and Licensing
Through the Intellectual Property System, 75 Fed. Reg. 57261 (Sept. 20, 2010), available
at http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2010/pdf/2010-23395.pdf (“The USPTO is also
exploring ideas for other strategies that would use the patent system to incentivize
activity addressing humanitarian needs.”).
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